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Formerly a favourite location for private capital inflows, Brazil was virtually cut off from
further bank lending in the 1980s. The country's rating in secondary loan markets plum-
meted, and foreign direct investment dwindled. New external financing was replaced by
an accumulation of interest arrears. Retained resources were used for consumption or
fueled capital flight, rather than being used for productive investment.
Brazil is significantly lagging behind Asian and Latin American competitors in facing the
fiercer worldwide competition for foreign capital. The seriously impaired attractiveness in
international capital markets is to be attributed to pronounced macroeconomic instability,
excessive government interference into goods and factor markets, as well as confronta-
tion with commmercial lenders and restrictive attitudes towards foreign investors.
After having lost one decade, Brazil should not risk another one. The country should fol-
low the example of Chile and Mexico, where the implementation of domestic policy
reforms was supported by voluntary debt-service concessions of external creditors. This
cooperative approach lowered the perception of country risk, led to the repatriation of
flight capital, and triggered a favourable investment response.
Domestic policy reforms are indispensable for regaining access to international capital
markets. The centerpiece of macroeconomic stabilization in Brazil must be to break infla-
tionary expectations through sustained fiscal consolidation. Recent progress in disman-
tling trade barriers must be supplemented by abandoning the tradition of interventionist
price policies in domestic goods markets. The deep-rooted structural deficiencies of
labour and financial markets have to be tackled, in order to stimulate human capital for-
mation and enhance efficient financial intermediation.
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During the 1970s, foreign investors and creditors were eager to engage in Brazil
in order to participate in the "Brazilian Economic Miracle" of high growth and
booming exports. The large though untapped domestic market as well as the coun-
try's endowment with vast natural resources and semi-skilled labour offered fa-
vourable profit opportunities. Foreign loans were easily available, and the country
was considered a priority location for foreign direct investment (FDI).
The situation has changed fundamentally in the 1980s. With the eruption of
the debt crisis, it became evident that the domestic market potential as well as the
availability of natural resources and labour were insufficient ingredients to gua-
rantee high returns on investment in the longer run. External shocks and mis-
guided economic policies rendered it impossible to sustain the impressive growth of
real gross domestic product (GDP) of 8.6 per cent in the 1970s. Foreign investors
and creditors became increasingly reluctant to transfer further capital to Brazil
(Table 1).
Only recently, foreign investors seem to rediscover Brazil. In the first quar-
ter of 1992, Brazilian borrowers raised external financing through new bond issues
Table 1 - Brazil: Selected Economic Indicators, 1970-1990
Real GDP growth (per cent)
Inflation (per cent)(b)
Gross domestic investment
(per cent of GDP)
Foreign debt, long-term
- US$ billion
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Source: World Bank [b]; IMF [b]; EIU [b, 1991-92].of over US$ 1 billion denominated in US dollars [World Bank, a, 1992, No. 1, p.
4]. Furthermore, the Brazilian stock market posted strong gains in the first
quarter of 1992 with a 36 per cent rise [ibid., p. 7]. However, a continued
availability of foreign capital has not been established so far. First market
reactions to perceived economic improvements do not yet seem to be based on
fundamental and sustainable policy reforms. At the end of March 1992, President
Fernando Collor de Melo had to change his cabinet almost completely, in order to
cope with increasing political pressure and persistent macroeconomic problems.
In sharp contrast to Brazil, the advanced developing countries of Asia have
established far-reaching economic reforms which enabled them to prevent major
financing problems in the 1980s [ Lai, 1987]. Even in Latin America, Brazil remains
one of the last countries to face reality. The country still sticks to its muddl-
ing-through politics of the 1980s [Nunnenkamp et al., 1992]. By contrast, the
reform process in neighbour countries, including Argentina, Chile, and Mexico is
already more advanced and pronounced.
In the subsequent analysis, Brazil's position in the international competition
for foreign capital is critically evaluated. The overall aim is to assess how the
country's access to internationally mobile capital could sustainably be enhanced.
Following this introduction, Section II analyzes the costs of Brazil's economic
policies with respect to its attractiveness for commercial lenders and foreign in-
vestors. Referring to empirical evidence from cross-country studies, Section III
reveals the crucial role of domestic policies for attracting capital inflows. The most
important policy areas are identified: macroeconomic stability, goods and factor
market policies, as well as the attitudes towards foreign lenders and investors.
Section IV evaluates Brazil's position vis-a-vis major competitors with respect to
these policy areas. The analysis results in conclusions on economic policy measures
which may help to improve the country's competitiveness in international capital
markets (Section V).
II. Brazil's Position in International Financial Markets
During the 1981 peak, total net resource flows to developing countries amounted to
US$ 138.6 billion, and 46.1 per cent of all flows were directed towards the Western
Hemisphere [OECD, 1989]. After the outbreak of the debt crisis, total net re-
source flows to developing countries declined gradually until 1986. This downward
trend was dominated by sharp cuts in private capital flows and particularly pro-Table 2 - Share of Asia and Latin America in Total Net Resource Flows to Devel-






































Source: OECD [1989; 1991]; own calculations.
nounced for Latin American countries [Nunnenkamp et al., 1992]. The share of net
resource flows to the Western Hemisphere dropped significantly in the beginning of
the last decade, and oscillated around this lower level thereafter (Table 2). By
contrast, the share of Asia increased remarkably in the early 1980s and remained
relatively stable thereafter.
Only at the end of the last decade, capital flows to Latin America started to
increase in absolute and relative terms compared to the seriously depressed level
of the second half of the 1980s. However, the financial situation among the coun-
tries of the Western Hemisphere remained diverse. Only a small number of coun-
tries benefited from the increase of private flows after 1988 (essentially Mexico,
Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela) [OECD, 1991, p. 21]. The majority of Latin
American countries including Brazil remained unattractive for foreign capital. This
is true for international bank lending as well as FDI.
Table 3 reveals most obviously the fundamental problem Latin American coun-
tries and, in particular, Brazil were facing. In Asian countries which continued to
service their debt, disbursements were increasing during the 1980s. By contrast,
credit disbursements of commercial banks to Latin American countries diminished
considerably. In 1980, disbursements reached US$ 33.0 billion, while debt-service
payments (interest and principal payments) amounted to US$ 30.2 billion. In 1989,
disbursements were down to US$ 5.1 billion, while debt-service payments were re-
duced to US$ 18.7 billion. This resulted in considerable negative net transfers,
which decreased only recently. In 1990, Chile as the country with the longest
reform history became the first Latin American country to have positive net trans-
fers after 1982.
Despite the similar pattern of commercial bank lending to major Latin American
debtors, secondary loan prices indicate sharp differences in the market valuation
of the debt (Table 4). Secondary loan prices of Brazilian debt were highest inTable 3 - Commercial Bank Lending to Developing Countries: Disbursements, Debt
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Source: World Bank [b, 1991-92].
1986 (75 per cent) compared to Argentine (66 per cent), Chilean (67 per cent),
and Mexican (56 per cent) debt paper. Brazil's notation plummeted by more than
50 percentage points to 22 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1989 and the subse-
quent improvement remained relatively weak. The drastic decline is only comparableTable 4 - Secondary Loan Prices: Selected Latin American Countries,
































































































































Source: World Bank [a].
to Argentina, where prices fell by 53 percentage points to 13 per cent in the same
quarter. For a number of years, the notation for Argentine debt paper was below
the notation for Brazilian debt. Recently, however, Brazil was outperformed even
by Argentina. The impressively improved notation for Argentina's debt reflects the
ongoing reform efforts in this country. Maintained reform efforts in Chile had as a
consequence that secondary market notations never fell below 55 per cent and in-
creased to 90 per cent in 1991. Mexican loan prices increased from less than 40
per cent in 1989 to 63 per cent in 1992, which can again be attributed to sustained
policy reforms.As in the case of commercial credits, FDI flows were concentrated on devel-
oped countries after the outbreak of the debt crisis [Langhammer, 1991; UNIDO,
1990]. The share of FDI flows to developing countries decreased significantly after
1982 to 15-16 per cent in 1989/90 (Table 5). FDI flows to Latin America were
twice as high as FDI flows to Asia in 1980. Subsequently, FDI flows to Asia in-
creased nearly sixfold, while flows to Latin America were less than 20 per cent
higher in 1990 as compared to 1980.
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49289 53970 48261 192446 179558 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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(a) Data expressed in SDRs are converted into US$ based on the US$/SDR exchange
rate (period averages) as given in IMF [b]. The sum of FDI flows to Asia and the
Western Hemisphere is larger than total flows to developing countries in 1980
because FDI flows to the Middle East were negative. - (b) Percentage values refer
to Latin America and not to world total. - (c) Not necessarily comparable to
previous data; source: Banco Central do Brasil [1992].
Source: IMF [a]; own calculations.
High FDI flows of USS 11.1 billion to Saudi Arabia contributed to the extra-
ordinary high share of FDI flows to developing countries in 1982. Omitting this
special effect, their share of FDI inflows amounted to 32. 5 per cent.Within Latin America, Brazil's situation deteriorated dramatically. In 1982,
nearly half of all FDI flows to the Western Hemisphere were directed to Brazil. The
share of Brazil decreased significantly to 14 per cent in 1990. By contrast, the
Mexican, Chilean and Argentine situation improved in relative and absolute terms
recently.
In summary, the analysis of foreign capital flows suggests that reform efforts
in Asian as well as selected Latin American countries were honoured by foreign
lenders and investors. Empirical evidence on the major determinants of debt and
FDI inflows will help to reveal the major bottlenecks towards an improved attrac-
tiveness for foreign capital in Brazil.
III. Major Determinants of Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries
This section summarizes the main results of recent empirical studies on the impact
of the recipient countries' economic policies and the risk perceptions of capital
suppliers with respect to a country's access to international capital markets. The
focus is on results which appear to be highly relevant for Brazil. Since the
determinants do not have to coincide, debt and FDI flows are analyzed separately,
although Section II provided first clues on similar reaction patterns of foreign
lenders and investors.
1. Determinants of International Creditworthiness
Even after risk illusions had been destroyed in the early 1980s, it continued to be
heavily debated whether the access to foreign loans could be encouraged by fa-
vourable domestic policies and good economic performance. The confusion about the
determinants of commercial bank lending appears to be mainly because conflicting
hypotheses apply to different lending regimes. Most importantly, a distinction has
to be drawn between voluntary lending and defensive lending (which is sometimes
called "involuntary" lending):
Therefore, lending to non-constrained borrowers is not considered in the fol-
lowing .
2
Defensive lending is defined according to Watson et al. [ 1988]. This lending
regime comprises countries for which concerted credit extension, i. e., equi-
proportional increases in loan exposure coordinated by bank advisory committees,10
- Ample evidence suggests that the borrowers' economic policies figured prominent-
ly in determining whether or not external debt became unmanageable. Hence,
well performing countries should have had better access to voluntary lending
recently.
- Under conditions of defensive lending, however, favourable policies and good
performance may even lead to reduced, rather than increased bank lending
[Krugman, 1988; 1989]. It may be in a bank syndicate's interest to provide loans
"involuntarily" to problem debtors such as Brazil in order to protect existing
claims. According to this reasoning, the incentive of banks to orchestrate new
loans is weakened if the market valuation of the inherited debt improves due to
policy reforms and better economic performance of the debtor.
These conflicting hypotheses have been tested by running separate (pooled
cross-country) regressions for 14 developing countries for which defensive lending
had been orchestrated in the 1980s and for 12 developing countries not benefiting
from such lending [Nunnenkamp, 1990]. The empirical results strongly contest the
notion of bad policies inducing further lending. The estimates rather indicate that
private creditors honoured adjustment efforts by easing credit constraints. The
access to international credit markets was improved e.g. by higher investment
2
ratios, better world-market performance and real exchange rate devaluation. This
result also holds for developing countries like Brazil for which defensive lending
took place. Hence, it was a losing proposition if Brazil attempted to attract more
(defensive) lending by unfavourable economic policies.
This does not mean, however, that narrowly defined adjustment programmes
were a sufficient condition for a resumption of commercial bank lending. This
qualification is particularly relevant for Brazil and other Latin American economies
where sovereign-risk and credibility problems have become evident since the early
1980s [El-Erian, 1991]. Sovereign-risk considerations relate to the willingness of a
country to service external obligations. The impact of sovereign risk on private
lending to developing countries is ambiguous at the theoretical level:
took place. The lending to countries without such concerted credit extension is
considered voluntary.
For a discussion of domestic policies with regard to debt problems, see e.g.
Baneth [1986]; Khan and Knight [1983]; Nunnenkamp [1986] and Zaidi [1985].
2
The latter result indicates that real exchange rates were overvalued in many
developing countries [Edwards, 1989].11
- According to standard arguments, rational lenders will consider the borrowers'
incentives to default when deciding whether to grant further credits (for an
overview, see Eaton et al. [1986]). Therefore, voluntary lending is supposed to
be negatively related to the benefits to be reaped from defaulting on external
debt, and positively related to the potential costs of such debtor behaviour.
- By contrast, the expectation of default may induce, rather than prevent further
lending to constrained borrowers once debt-servicing problems have emerged
[Krugman, 1988; Cohen, Sachs, 1986, pp. 539 f. ].
Empirical estimates support the standard sovereign-risk argument that net
transfers are negatively related to the benefits that debtors may realize by de-
faulting on external debt [ Nunnenkamp, 1990]. Defensive loan disbursements did
not improve the borrowers' access to international credit markets in terms of net
transfers.
2. Determinants of the Attractiveness for Foreign Direct Investment
The question of how to revitalize FDI flows is today all the more relevant, as
expectations are being pinned increasingly on FDI to alleviate foreign debt prob-
lems. Pooled cross-country regressions for the 1980s revealed that the traditional
2
set of explanatory variables has to be extended [Agarwal et al., 1991]. Most
importantly, sovereign-risk considerations, the impact of political and economic
instability as well as the host country's attitudes towards FDI have to be included.
Major results that are relevant in the Brazilian context can be summarized as
follows. First, foreign investors accounted for risks originating from difficulties of
developing countries to service their external debt. Under conditions of a debt
overhang, foreign investors refrained from further engagements. The underlying
fear is that income from productive investment declines due to higher future taxes
(in order to service the inherited debt) [Sachs, 1989] and stagnating markets.
Consequently, overindebted countries such as Brazil will face difficulties in at-
tracting FDI unless debt problems are overcome.
The borrowers' benefits from default primarily depend on the debt-service bur-
den [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981, p. 302]. When considering the default costs, the
borrowers have to take into account the sanctions that may be imposed on them
by the creditors [Sachs, 1984, pp. 17 f. ].
2
They include trade relations, the size and the growth of the host countries'
domestic markets, currency valuation, and labour costs.12
Second, the expectation of continued political and economic instabilities tend
to increase the problems of cost-benefit analysis by entrepreneurs. It is, hence,
not surprising that instability clearly reduced the attractiveness of a country for
foreign investors [see also Edwards, 1991; Schneider, Frey, 1985].
Third, FDI inflows were negatively affected by overly restrictive attitudes of
host countries towards foreign investors. In the 1980s, many countries moved
towards more liberal ownership regulations, non-bureaucratic approval procedures
and favourable rules on the repatriation of profits and capital [UNCTC, 1988].
This trend impaired the attractiveness for FDI of host countries such as Brazil
that maintained relatively strict regulations (for details, see Section IV. 3). More-
over, sovereign-risk considerations influenced the behaviour of foreign investors
in relatively restrictive countries. Potential benefits from expropriations - proxied
by the ratio of FDI stocks over GDP - discouraged further inflows to such coun-
tries [ Agarwal et al. , 1991]. By contrast, high FDI stocks induced even more
flows to countries with favourable attitudes towards FDI. The latter result under-
lines that a liberal treatment of FDI and a cooperative stance of host countries
towards foreign investors helps to enhance the attractiveness for FDI through
reputation building.
Furthermore, government interventions in goods and factor markets were
shown to be crucially important for attracting risk capital [ Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp
et al., 1991]:
- Discriminatory taxes and subsidies, administrative price fixing, and similar
measures interfere with the relative profitability of production among sectors.
Empirical evidence also suggests that excessive trade interventions induce an
inefficient use of resources, which ultimately undermines a country's position in
the international competition for risk capital [ see also Krueger, 1990, Part
III]. This result challenges the widespread belief that import protection is a
promising means to attract FDI.
- A country's competitive position in international capital markets is further affec-
ted by unfavourable capital and labour market conditions. Financial repression
characterized by low or even negative real interest rates discourages domestic
In the literature it has sometimes been argued that import barriers served as an
incentive for FDI as the latter is a medium to jump over protectionist fences (see
e.g. the survey results of Kayser et al. [1981]). Econometric estimates indi-
cated, however, that export activity was a predecessor of German FDI in devel-
oping countries. Market penetration had a significantly positive impact on FDI,
while the degree of import barriers in the host countries affected FDI negatively
[Agarwal et al., 1991].13
savings and the transmission of savings into loanable funds. Complementary
domestic capital required to attract FDI remains insufficient. With respect to
labour market conditions, it has frequently been argued that cheap labour repre-
sents a major element of a developing country's attractiveness for foreign capi-
tal. Notwithstanding relatively low unit-labour costs, however, a country is
unlikely to become an attractive investment location if a particularly poor endow-
ment with human capital is a binding constraint for economic development, or
ineffective collective bargaining arrangements lead to excessive labour market
disputes.
All in all, foreign investors responded to restrictive regulations, policy-
induced distortions and transfer risks in a similar way as did foreign lenders.
Parallel behaviour of capital suppliers has as a consequence that the chances of
debt-ridden countries such as Brazil to restructure their external financing are
limited at best unless the attractiveness for both types of foreign finance is im-
proved. The specific reform requirements for Brazil are assessed in the subse-
quent section.
IV. Major Bottlenecks in Brazil to an Improved Attractiveness
for Foreign Capital
Section III revealed that the major obstacles for an improved attractiveness for
foreign capital are not exogenous to the policy-making apparatus, but could be
removed by appropriate policy measures. Policy areas that are of overriding im-
portance in the competition for foreign capital have been identified. They include:
- macroeconomic stability;
- the level of government interference into goods and factor markets;
- the attitudes towards foreign creditors and investors.
Macroeconomic stability and the removal of goods and factor market distortions
are required in order to help improve the investment conditions and the servicing
of external debt obligations. A cooperative stance towards foreign capital suppliers
signals the government's willingness to contain sovereign risk and to restore
credibility. As demonstrated in the following, Brazil lags behind major competitors
with respect to all three policy areas.14
1. Macroeconomic Instability
Sources of macroeconomic instability may derive from the domestic economy or the
country's international economic relations. Therefore, indicators of both types of
instability have to be considered.
- Inflation: High and volatile inflation rates represent an obvious sign of unsound
management of the economy [Greene, Villanueva, 1991; Schneider, Frey, 1985].
- Budget deficit: High and rising public deficits fuel inflationary expectations or
make private agents anticipate a tighter credit squeeze and crowding out in the
future.
- Exchange-rate fluctuation: High volatility of the key price concerning a coun-
try's external relations creates considerable uncertainties with respect to both
trade and capital flows.
The ranking of 26 mainly middle-income developing countries with respect to
the above three indicators reveals that Brazil was among the most unstable sample
2
countries in the second half of the 1980s (Table 6). The country represented the
tail-light as concerns average annual inflation rates and the magnitude of budget
deficits. Taking the three indicators together, Brazil achieved only 14 out of 78
possible ranking points. In this respect, only Mexico performed even worse during
1985-1988.
In contrast to Mexico, the position of Brazil has not improved substantially
since the late 1980s. Recent evidence rather suggests that macroeconomic insta-
bility continued to be a major problem:
- Notwithstanding periodic price freezes and controls, the annual average of
consumer-price inflation was even higher in 1989-1990 than before. After the
defreezing of prices in mid-1991, monthly inflation rates again returned quickly
3
to double-digit levels.
- An astounding turnaround was achieved in the public sector accounts. Figures
for 1989 put the operational deficit of the non-financial public sector at nearly 7
per cent of GDP [EIU, b, 1991-92, p. 39]. In sharp contrast, official figures for
For a detailed discussion of the underlying economic rationale and additional
indicators, see Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991, Chapter III].
2
For reasons of comparability, Table 6 refers to the period 1985-1988, since more
recent data were lacking for several sample countries.
The annual averages of inflation amounted to 1287 per cent (1989), 2938 per cent
(1990) and 465 per cent (estimate for 1991) [EIU, a, No. 1, 1992, p. 3].15
Table 6 - Brazil's Ranking in Terms of Macroeconomic Instability within a Sample of
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Source: Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991].
1990 recorded a surplus of 1.3 per cent of GDP, and a similar figure was expec-
ted for 1991. However, this drastic improvement is difficult to sustain. It was
largely achieved through extraordinary measures and transitory influences such
as the accumulation of arrears on the external debt and the deferment of pay-16
ments on the internal debt [see also Ohana, Mussi, 1991]. The resurgence of
inflation in mid-1991 reflects the low credibility of fiscal consolidation.
- As concerns exchange-rate volatility, recent evidence suggests increased rather
than reduced instability. The index of the real effective exchange rate (deflated
by wholesale prices) plummeted from 1988 = 100 to around 50 in March 1990,
indicating a drastic real appreciation of the domestic currency. Considerable
fluctuations continued in 1990 and 1991 [ EIU, a, ].
All in all, macroeconomic instability continues to be a major stumbling-bloc to
an improvement of Brazil's attractiveness for foreign capital. It remains the cen-
terpiece of macroeconomic reforms to break inflationary expectations. To this end,
fiscal consolidation must be sustainable, i. e., based on a permanent restructuring
of government revenues and expenditures. Without success at the inflation front
any attempt to devalue the real exchange rate is not sustainable [ Schweickert,
1991] and will, therefore, add to real exchange rate instability.
2. Interventionist Government Poiicies
a. Goods Market Distortions
The competitive position of Brazil with respect to goods market distortions is
2
difficult to assess in quantitative terms in a cross-country perspective. Never-
theless, there is strong evidence that policy interventions in goods markets con-
tributed considerably to the country's impaired attractiveness for foreign capital.
The assessment by the World Economic Forum [a], which includes qualitative
survey data, clearly points to competitive disadvantages of Brazil vis-a-vis nine
major competitors. State intervention was considered to be most pervasive in Brazil
in 1990, and the international orientation of the economy was revealed to be weaker
only in India and Indonesia. More specifically, the ranking of Brazil was extremely
unfavourable in the late 1980s and early 1990s as regards particular indicators of
goods market distortions [Nunnenkamp et al., 1992, Appendix III; World Economic
Expenditures on federal debt servicing fell by 88 per cent in real terms in 1990;
their share in total expenditure fell from 33.8 per cent to 6. 1 per cent [ EIU, a,
No. 1, 1991, p. 14].
2
The empirical verification suffers from data constraints and conceptual flaws due
to country-specific circumstances. This applies especially to the tax system and
openness indicators (for details, see Nunnenkamp et al., [1992]).17
Forum, a, 1991, p. 117]. Most noteworthy are: entry regulations resulting in
oligopolistic market structures [see also Porst, 1991, p. 53], excessive state
ownership, price regulations, price distortions by government subsidies, unequal
fiscal treatment among enterprises, high trade barriers, and restrictive local-
content requirements.
Further evidence on policy-induced goods market distortions has been pre-
sented in country-specific analyses [see e.g. EIU, a; Carneiro, Werneck, 1989;
Porst, 1991]. According to Carneiro, Werneck [1989], 3-4 per cent of GDP was
transferred each year to the private sector in the form of government expenditures
or forgone revenue during the 1980s. To a large degree, these transfers were
selective and discriminatory. Examples were the plethora of fiscal exemptions, as
well as cheap inputs and special credit facilities for so-called priority sectors. The
applied import-substitution strategy "implied the choice of selected capitalists which
were eligible to receive substantial transfers from the public vaults. In return, the
level of direct bureaucratic controls over imports, prices and export permits has
probably never been so high and widespread in the Brazilian economy" [ibid., pp.
26 f. ].
More recently, some goods market distortions were relaxed while the govern-
ment continued to resort to periodic domestic price controls. Since the late 1980s,
the government has lowered import tariffs quite considerably (most notably for
industrial inputs). The number of prohibited import items has been reduced, quan-
titative restrictions have been relaxed, financing restrictions on capital goods
imports have been removed, and selective export incentives under the so-called
BEFIEX-scheme have been phased out. Most importantly, the extensive system of
discretionary and non-tariff barriers has been tackled. These measures were cer-
tainly steps in the right direction, i. e., to improve the Brazilian industry's com-
petitiveness by helping it to lower production costs. However, the sustainability of
trade liberalization is threatened as long as the domestic currency is overvalued in
real terms (see Section IV. 1), thereby putting considerable pressure on the bal-
ance of payments.
Interventionist price policies persisted at the internal front. The Summer Plan
of early 1989 represented another attempt to tackle run-away inflation through a
freeze on the prices of 180 basic products. Serious price distortions emerged, com-
bined with speculative buying and hoarding. Erratic price-policy changes continued
An important administrative change was the abolition of the Foreign Trade De-
partment of the Bank of Brazil (CACEX) in 1990, which may have reduced
uncertainties about the future course of foreign trade policy.18
into the Collor administration. Although formal price controls were removed in
1990, prices remained policed with hundreds of companies being forced to submit
monthly reports on production costs and prices, and the government being commit-
ted to prevent "abusive" pricing [EIU, a, No. 3, 1990, p. 9]. In another abrupt
change of course, the government adopted a new price freeze in early 1991 (the
fifth since 1986) after inflation had soared and attempts to form a social pact
(Entendimento Nacional) had failed.
The return to double-digit monthly inflation rates points to the importance of
macroeconomic stability for a credible reduction of goods market distortions. In-
terventionist policies will be expected to persist or to return unless fiscal restraint
is credible (see Section IV. 1) and trade liberalization is accompanied by a compet-
itive real exchange rate.
b. Factor Market Distortions
Labour costs, the extent of labour market unrest and the endowment with human
capital determine the attractiveness of labour-market conditions. Cross-country
comparisons of unit-labour costs mainly refer to the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, they
indicate important policy challenges facing the Brazilian government. Brazil had
clear labour cost advantages in manufacturing industries such as iron and steel as
well as automobile production during the 1970s, not only vis-a-vis industrialized
countries but also vis-a-vis newly industrializing competitors such as South Korea
[Picht, 1987; Fischer, Nunnenkamp et al., 1988]. However, trends in unit-labour
costs since the mid-1970s showed a rise of unit-labour costs in Brazil, whereas
cost reductions were achieved e.g. in South Korea, Mexico and Taiwan. Brazil's
loss in unit-labour-cost advantages was due to relatively large increases of hourly
labour costs and an insufficient improvement of labour productivity. Its position
was increasingly challenged by a small group of other newly industrializing coun-
tries.
This is rather unlikely to have changed significantly, notwithstanding tempor-
ary setbacks in manufacturing earnings in recent years. According to the World
Economic Forum [a], Brazil's ranking continued to be extremely poor as far as
labour productivity developments are concerned. The poor record in terms of R&D
efforts and technological improvements points into the same direction [Nunnen-
For a discussion of conceptual flaws and data problems, see Picht [1987].19
kamp et al. , 1992, Appendix III]. Discrepancies between wage and productivity
developments may at least partly be traced to a wide range of labour-market
interventions. They comprise, e.g., minimum wages, regulations on effective work-
ing time and job termination, and non-wage labour costs [Spinanger, 1988; see also
Porst, 1991, pp. 126 ff. ]. Brazil's international competitive position was affected in
particular vis-a-vis Asian countries where labour markets have remained relatively
free of policies either directly or indirectly increasing labour costs. Hence, labour-
market policies should be carefully reviewed and revised where necessary.
Such a review should include collective bargaining arrangements which gave
rise to laboui—market unrest. Measured by the number of strikes and lockouts per
worker in the manufacturing sector, Brazil ranked in a medium position among 21
sample countries in 1985-1988 [Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al., 1991, Table 17]. But
this situation marked a significant deterioration of industrial relations during the
1980s. The number of strikes and lockouts per 1000 workers soared from 1.7 in
1981 to 26.1 in 1987. Frequent strikes and unofficial stoppages continued to be a
salient feature more recently: "an increase in labour militancy" was reported in
1990 [EIU, a, No. 4, 1990, p. 7]. It is, thus, not surprising that Brazil ranked
most unfavourably when experts were asked to which extent industrial relations in
ten newly industrializing countries were conducive to labour peace [ World Economic
Forum, a, 1990, p. 227].
Brazil's competitive position is similarly weak as concerns its endowment with
human capital. The scarcity of skilled labour can be traced to the public education
system and vocational training facilities, which are both inadequate to meet the
requirements of a competitive economy [Nunnenkamp et al., 1992, Appendix III].
Further evidence is provided by comparing the ratio of secondary school enrollees
in per cent of the respective population age cohort among developing countries
[Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al., 1991, Table 18]. During the 1980s, Brazil hardly
succeeded to raise this ratio (1979-1984: 34-35 per cent; 1985-1988: 37 per cent).
Consequently, Brazil ranked at the lower end of a sample of 26 countries in the
late 1980s, and was even surpassed by countries with significantly lower per capita
income such as Colombia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Peru, the Philippines, Sri Lanka,
and Zimbabwe.
In a summary assessment of labour-market conditions in 95 countries, Frost &
Sullivan [ 1988] placed Brazil in the least attractive country group. The ranking
See also EIU [b, 1990-91, p. 9]: "The quality of education has deteriorated
dramatically since 1980. "20
was based on the availability of adequate labour, the level of wages, and the
flexibility in the use of labour. This unfavourable position of Brazil appears to be
consistent with the evidence presented above.
As concerns domestic capital market conditions, the picture is similarly bleak.
This is evident from Brazil's tail-light position in terms of capital market per-
formance and the quality of financial services [ World Economic Forum, a]. A de-
terioration of Brazil's ranking was reported since the mid-1980s. Three factors
stand out at the beginning of the 1990s: First of all, financial intermediation is
generally deficient and does not meet the requirements of an internationally compet
itive economy. Banks play a limited role as a source of lending, and the range of
financial alternatives available to enterprises is fairly narrow. Second, the
government and state banks strongly interfere with the allocation of financial
resources. Private sector companies, and particularly foreign enterprises, are at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis the public sector in accessing capital markets. Third,
lending for non-privileged enterprises is expensive. Short-term interest rates were
typically very high in real terms in recent years [EIU, a].
The lending possibilities of banks have often been constrained in the context
of stabilization programmes. A freeze on lending was an element of the Summer
Plan of early 1989. Similarly, commercial lending was curtailed by the Collor Plan
which asked the banks to use a significant share of their funds for buying pri-
vatization certificates (Certif icados de Privatizapao). Generally, it is hardly
possible to provide medium and long-term investment loans because savers prefer
extremely short-term deposits (e.g. in the overnight market). It is, thus, not
surprising that bank credits contracted in real terms over much of the 1980s
[Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al., 1991, Table 13].
Financial deepening, proxied by the supply of broad money (M2) relative to
GDP, was found to be particularly poor in Brazil. The country ranked at the
bottom of the sample of 26 developing countries and was again surpassed by many
less advanced competitors [ibid.]. This unfavourable position has, of course,
largely to be attributed to the highly inflationary environment in Brazil. Extremely
high rates of inflation contributed to the demonetization of the economy. The
evidence on financial deepening provides another indication of the interrelatedness
of policy failures, and underlines the earlier conclusion that comprehensive and
consistent reforms are required to improve Brazil's international competitiveness.
For example, the indicator values of the proxy of financial deepening were about
twice and three times higher for Sri Lanka and Uruguay as compared to Brazil in
the mid-1980s.21
Isolated financial market reforms will be of limited use unless macroeconomic in-
stability is contained. At the same time, macro stabilization is unlikely to do the
job alone. The structural deficiencies of the Brazilian financial system are clearly
demonstrated by the fact that financial deepening was lower than in other Latin
American countries which were plagued by similarly high inflation (e.g. Argentina
and Peru).
3. Attitudes towards Foreign Capital Inflows
a. External Debt
Brazil's external debt strategy was characterized by partial default, temporary and
unilateral debt-service moratoria, and protracted debt renegotiations with its
foreign creditors [see e.g. EIU, b, 1991-92, pp. 46 f. ]. In contrast to other
debtor countries, most recently Mexico, Brazil did not adjust to the debt crisis by
attempting to restore its international creditworthiness through sustained macro-
economic stabilization and structural reforms. It rather pursued a non-cooperative
debt strategy. Within two years (1983-1984), Brazil submitted seven letters of
intent to the IMF. The result were two waivers, three modifications of targets, and
two suspensions [Cardoso, Fishlow, 1989, p. 84]. Negotiations with the IMF broke
down in late 1985, and Brazil declared a moratorium on interest payments to com-
mercial banks in early 1987. Resumed IMF negotiations were again suspended in
1989 because of the government's failure to meet the targets on public sector
deficits. As a result, interest arrears on commercial bank debt soared (end-1990:
US$ 9.6 billion [World Bank, b, 1991-92]).
a
Underlying Brazil's debt policies throughout the 1980s was the politicians'
believe that there exists a choice between paying the external debt and domestic
economic growth (see e.g. the statements of various politicians during the electoral
campaign of 1989). However, Brazil's actual performance clearly demonstrates that
such an alternative does not exist:
- Non-cooperative debt policies resulted in lower rather than higher net transfers
(see Section II). Mutually agreed debt reschedulings proved to be particularly
difficult under Brazilian conditions. The amount of Brazilian debt which was re-
An agreement on interest arrears with commercial banks was achieved in May
1991, which was again followed by negotiations with the IMF.22
scheduled (relative to GDP) was lower than in most other middle-income countries
with serious debt problems (Table 7).




























Source: Hiemenz, Nunnenkamp et al. [1991].
- Resources retained through partial default did not result in better economic
performance. The Brazilian situation at the end of the 1980s was rather
characterized by stagflation (Table 1). The investment ratio was still lower than
in the 1970s. Under such unfavourable economic conditions, retained resources
were used for consumption or fueled capital flight, rather than being used for
productive investment.
Brazil fits fairly well into the cross-country evidence presented in Section
III. Non-cooperative debt policies reduced net debt inflows and, additionally,
impaired the attractiveness of the country for foreign investors. The costs of
unilaterally enforced debt-service reduction might be reduced or even avoided if
Brazil follows a two-sided approach. The implementation of sound economic policies
would then be supported by voluntary and market-based debt and debt-service re-
duction. This is basically the cooperative strategy adopted by Chile and, more
recently, Mexico, which had several positive effects for these countries:
- It triggered a better investment response than the non-cooperative approach of
Brazil. The share of private investment in GDP increased from the bottom value
of 11 per cent in 1983 to 14.8 per cent in 1990 in Mexico, and from 4.9 to 15.6
per cent in the case of Chile [ Pfeffermann, Madarassy, 1992].
In the case of Chile and Mexico, the menu of mutually agreed debt concessions
included voluntary market-based debt-equity conversions, direct cash buybacks,
conversions of debt into collateralized discount bonds, reduced interest par
bonds, etc.23
- The debt burden was alleviated substantially. Chile reduced its debt to banks by
more than half in four years. Gross bank-debt reduction through conversions
into bonds amounted to US$ 15 billion in the case of Mexico [El-Erian, 1991].
- The perceptions of country risk were lowered, and debt-overhang concerns of
foreign capital suppliers were reduced (see Section II, Table 4).
- Flight capital was repatriated to a significant extent. A study by Chartered West
LB Ltd., quoted in El-Erian [1991], estimated net total inflows of flight capital
of US$ 14 billion for Chile, Mexico and Venezuela in 1989-1990 (as compared to
outflows of US$ 4.5 billion in 1987-1988). *
In summary, the experience of Chile and Mexico demonstrates that even
highly indebted Latin American countries are able to overcome external financial
constraints by opting for domestic policy reforms and cooperative debt negotia-
tions. Both countries clearly outperformed Brazil with respect to the attractiveness
for credit suppliers.
b. Foreign Direct Investment
Brazil's relative attractiveness for FDI deteriorated during the 1980s even though
the country did not change dramatically with respect to its overall openness to-
2
wards FDI. This is not surprising since cross-country evidence clearly indicates
that the decisions of foreign investors are influenced by risk perceptions which
relate to the external debt situation (see Section III. 2). Moreover, other major
recipients of FDI in the Third World liberalized regulations to a considerable extent
[UNCTC, 1988], leaving Brazil with a relatively poor image in recent years. The
deterioration of Brazil's relative position is evident from Table 8, which compares
the ranking of developing countries in 1980 and 1988 with respect to their open-
ness towards FDI:
- The 1980-ranking is based on an assessment by the Ifo Institute for 36 countries
[Osterkamp, 1983]. This study covers various aspects of FDI regulations, e.g.
restrictions on the financing of FDI; locational choices; the use of imported and
domestic inputs; employment opportunities; production technologies; production
and distribution activities; pricing policies; capital and profit remittances. Addi-
For a detailed discussion on Mexico, see Lustig [1991].
2
The rather restrictive Lei da Informatica represented a notable exception.24
tionally, tax rates, the administrative efficiency, uncertainties arising from
dispute settlement, and expropriation risks were evaluated.
- The 1988-ranking is constructed from an assessment by Frost <S Sullivan [ 1988]
for 95 countries. The nine criteria included in the ranking of Table 8 are similar
to the 1980-assessment: controls on ownership, approval process, dispute settle-
ment, employment of nationals, performance requirements, exchange controls,
repatriation restrictions, investment incentives, and tax rates.
Although the two rankings of Table 8 are not strictly comparable, the de-
cline of Brazil from the top to the bottom of the sample is striking. A similarly
drastic change in the ranking (in the opposite direction) is only observed for
South Korea, which opened up towards FDI in the 1980s. The liberalization of FDI
regulations in major competing countries leaves much to be desired about Brazil's
relative attractiveness for FDI.
On closer inspection of the various criteria underlying the 1988-ranking, some
areas can be identified in which policy action is most urgently required to improve
Brazil's position. For six (out of nine) criteria, the country is posited in a very
unfavourable category (score 2; the average score of all 95 countries for the
2
respective criterion is given as a reference measure in parentheses):
- approval process, i. e. : the amount of time and expense involved in obtaining
required bureaucratic approvals; honesty and competence of the bureaucracy;
de facto requirements for local agents and cash outlays (average: 2.75);
- employment of nationals, i. e. : the existence and enforcement of quotas mandating
employment of host country nationals; requirements for local participation in
management; residence requirements for foreign nationals intended to limit ex-
patriate employment (average: 3.25);
- performance requirements, i.e.: regulations concerning local content, offsetting
part of imports with exports, countertrade, barter, and devoting a percentage of
production to exports; regulations concerning the use and sharing of technology
(average: 3.42);
- exchange controls, i.e.: ease of access to the foreign exchange needed to con-
duct business; use of multiple exchange rates (average: 3.08);
Differences exist in the selection of indicators, and national biases in the
evaluation are likely. The assessment by the Ifo Institute is mainly based on
"learned judgement" by German experts.
n 1 n 2
Each country was scored by Frost & Sullivan [1988] on a 1-5 basis, with "1
being the least favourable and "5" being the most favourable score.25
Table 8 - Ranking of Developing Countries with Respect to Their Openness to-
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Source: Osterkamp [1983]; Frost & Sullivan [1988].
- repatriation restrictions, i. e. : severity of restrictions on repatriating profits and
capital, including limitations and taxes (average: 3.56);
- investment incentives, i. e. : scope and magnitude of incentives in the form of tax
holidays, free trade zones, and subsidies (average: 3.39).
The deviation from the sample average was most pronounced with respect to
performance requirements and repatriation restrictions. More recent studies on the
climate for foreign investment in Brazil suggest that the picture has not changed
fundamentally since the late 1980s. One of the major concerns is that restrictions
It is noteworthy, however, that Porst [1991, p. 81] draws a much more favour-
able picture as far as repatriation restrictions in Brazil are concerned. He points
out that the government generally refrained from imposing transfer restrictions
even when the foreign exchange situation was critical. Major exceptions were
delayed remittances in 1989 and the blocking of dividend and profit remittances
which foreign investors had deposited in central-bank accounts in March 199026
imposed on technology transfers may lead to a technological isolation of Brazil.
Bottlenecks are mainly due to bureaucratic interference with licensing agreements,
technology contracts and consultancy [ Porst, 1991, p. 96].
The overall picture on FDI policies in Brazil indicates that reform require-
ments go far beyond the most recent steps to revive FDI. In May 1991, a propo-
sal permitting FDI in the Brazilian stock market was approved by the National
Monetary Council. Until recently, foreign institutional investors could only buy
Brazilian stocks through foreign equity funds established in the country. Similar
possibilities for foreign companies and individuals were envisaged.
A great potential for FDI was seen in the context of debt-equity conversions
2
linked to privatization operations. These swaps involve a considerable subsidiza-
tion of investors. Under conditions of a seriously eroded credibility of the govern-
ment, the temporary subsidization of FDI may be justified until the confidence of
investors has been restored. However, attempts to attract FDI by offering subsi-
dies while, at the same time, maintaining restrictive regulations are likely to fail.
FDI promotion schemes must not be misunderstood as a substitute for a compre-
hensive review of restrictive FDI policies which have contributed to the country's
impaired attractiveness for foreign risk capital.
V. Policy Conclusions
The "Brazilian Economic Miracle" of high real growth is long over. Formerly a
favourite location for foreign creditors and investors, Brazil's attractiveness for
(Collor Plan). Additional problems with which foreign investors are confronted in
Brazil comprise: strictly limited access to local financing [ EIU, b, 1990-91, p.
48; Porst, 1991, pp. 82 f. ], no access to subsidized credits of the national
development bank (BNDES), and discrimination of foreign companies in public
procurement.
In early 1992, the Congress discussed to eliminate the progressive taxation of
dividends above 12 per cent of registered capital, the prohibition of intra-firm
royalty payments, and the tax on foreign exchange transactions in the capital
account [EIU, a, No. 1, 1992, p. 22].
2
However, restrictions on debt-equity swaps were maintained until early 1992
[EIU, a, No. 1, 1992, p. 22].
However, any subsidization must be limited to the degree which is necessary to
compensate for increased risk during the transition period [ Agarwal et al.,
1991]. A waste of public resources can be avoided by introducing auction mecha-
nisms into debt-equity swap operations.27
capital inflows has been seriously eroded during the 1980s. A non-cooperative debt
strategy as well as frequent and unsuccessful stabilization attempts characterized
the country's politics in the past decade. This muddling-through approach dis-
couraged private capital inflows. Only very recently, Brazil regained access to
some international financing. However, first rewards for perceived political changes
are not yet based on fundamental and sustainable economic reforms.
Empirical evidence from cross-country studies stresses the significant role of
domestic policies to regain access to foreign capital on a sustainable basis. Major
bottlenecks towards an improved attractiveness in international capital markets are
not exogenous to the policy-making apparatus. However, isolated policy measures,
e.g. the promotion of FDI through subsidization, are not promising. Internal
adjustment efforts have to be comprehensive and credible. Macroeconomic sta-
bilization, the removal of goods and factor market distortions, as well as a liberal
and cooperative attitude towards foreign creditors and investors, are all prerequi-
sites for the recovery of substantial private capital inflows. Brazil was clearly
outperformed by its major competitors with respect to these crucial policy areas.
This explains the country's low attractiveness for foreign private capital and,
simultaneously, indicates the policy agenda for the coming years.
It remains the centerpiece of macroeconomic reforms in Brazil to break infla-
tionary expectations. To this end, fiscal consolidation must be sustainable, i. e.,
based on a growth-oriented restructuring of government revenues and expendi-
tures. Success at the inflation front would also help to stabilize real exchange
rates and, thereby, plug another source of macro instability.
The government should continue to remove policy-induced goods market
distortions. The recent progress achieved in dismantling trade barriers must be
sustained, which, inter alia, requires to avoid exchange-rate overvaluation. Liber-
alization at the external front must be supplemented by discontinuing the tradition
of interventionist price policies in domestic markets.
As concerns factor market policies, the competitive position of Brazil in the
global race for risk capital must be improved by overcoming labour market defic-
iencies. It is illusory to expect that this could be achieved within a short period
of time. Insufficient labour productivity, non-cooperative industrial relations and
the shortage of human capital are deep-rooted in the socio-political climate of the
country. However, this must not be regarded as an excuse to carefully review
restrictive labour market regulations, and to evaluate the possibilities for restruc-
turing government spending in favour of human-capital formation. Similarly, it will
take time to overcome the structural deficiencies of domestic financial markets in28
Brazil. But again, there is scope for immediate policy action. Most importantly,
discriminatory practices with regard to the allocation of financial resources should
be discontinued.
Brazil is well advised to build up a reputation as a cooperative borrower and
host of FDI. Persistent confrontation with its creditors will not only impair the
chances for renewed private lending. It will also have adverse implications on FDI
inflows. The recent liberalization of FDI regulations in major competing countries
(e.g. in Asia) leaves much to be desired about Brazil's relative attractiveness for
FDI. Reform requirements go beyond recent steps to revive FDI. The first priority
should not be given to costly promotion schemes, e.g. in the context of debt-
equity swaps. It is more promising to relax restrictive performance requirements
and to refrain from bureaucratic interference with licensing agreements etc. Brazil
could then benefit from technology transfers to a greater extent.
Obviously, the above policy areas are closely intertwined. Structural reforms
in particular markets may fail if macroeconomic instability is going to persist. At
the same time, the chances for macro stabilization could be improved if structural
weaknesses of factor and goods markets were overcome. Reform programmes have
to be comprehensive and consistent to restore the Brazilian government's credibili-
ty and to trigger a favourable response by foreign capital suppliers (and domestic
investors!). A renewed inflow of capital, in turn, would add to the sustainability
of domestic adjustment efforts.
Economic integration in Western Europe and the transformation process in
Central and Eastern Europe will further intensify the global competition for foreign
capital. Debt and FDI flows to developing countries will not necessarily be impaired
by these developments. However, immediate action is required by countries with
unfavourable investment conditions. Otherwise they will be pushed to the sidelines.
Brazil is seriously lagging behind, even in a Latin American context, in facing the
ongoing changes in the international economic environment. It is time to make
substantial progress in liberalizing and stabilizing the economy. After having lost
one decade, Brazil should not risk another one.29
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